{
  "number": 5746,
  "title": "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension",
  "authors": [
    "E. Rescorla",
    "M. Ray",
    "S. Dispensa",
    "N. Oskov"
  ],
  "published": "2010-02",
  "status": "Proposed Standard",
  "stream": "IETF",
  "area": "sec",
  "working_group": "tls",
  "pages": 15,
  "formats": [
    "TXT",
    "HTML"
  ],
  "abstract": "Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from a client. The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data. This specification defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over, thus preventing this attack. [STANDARDS-TRACK]",
  "keywords": [
    "ssl",
    "secure socket layer"
  ],
  "draft": "draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03",
  "doi": "10.17487/RFC5746",
  "updates": [
    "RFC2246",
    "RFC4346",
    "RFC4347",
    "RFC4366",
    "RFC5246"
  ],
  "urls": {
    "html": "https://rfc.dk/rfc5746/",
    "text": "https://rfc.dk/rfc5746.txt",
    "rfc_editor": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5746",
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5746/"
  },
  "text_modified": "2010-02-10T21:12:17Z"
}