RFC 10097
Tiebreaking Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchors
RFC 10097 is a Proposed Standard published in November 2026 in the IETF stream by the sidrops working group.
Proposed Standard IETF stream sidrops WG Operations and Management
- Updates
- RFC 8630
- Citations
- Cites 8 RFCs
Abstract
A Trust Anchor (TA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority (CA) certificate. Over time, Relying Parties (RPs) may have acquired multiple different issuances of valid TA certificates from the same TA operator. This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme to be used by RPs to select one TA certificate for certification path validation. This document updates RFC 8630.
Plain text 12 KB · rfc-editor.org · Datatracker · doi:10.17487/RFC10097 · draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ta-tiebreaker-06
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Snijders
Request for Comments: 10097 BSD
Updates: 8630 T. Buehler
Category: Standards Track OpenBSD
ISSN: 2070-1721 T. de Kock
RIPE NCC
November 2026
Tiebreaking Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchors
Abstract
A Trust Anchor (TA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority (CA)
certificate. Over time, Relying Parties (RPs) may have acquired
multiple different issuances of valid TA certificates from the same
TA operator. This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme to be used
by RPs to select one TA certificate for certification path
validation. This document updates RFC 8630.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10097.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements Language
1.2. Related Work
2. Updates to RFC 8630
3. Security Considerations
4. IANA Considerations
5. Normative References
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) hierarchical
structure, a Trust Anchor (TA) is an authority for which trust is
assumed and not derived. TA operators periodically reissue TA
certificates to update the validity period (Section 4.1.2.5 of
[RFC5280]), the Subject Information Access (SIA) extension
(Section 4.2.2.2 of [RFC5280]), the Certificate Policies extension
(Section 4.2.1.4 of [RFC5280]), and the Internet Number Resources
(INRs) ([RFC3779]).
Relying Parties (RPs) periodically fetch TA certificates from online
locations and verify that the key of the self-signed certificate
matches the key embedded in its associated Trust Anchor Locator (TAL)
[RFC8630]. This transfer may happen via an unauthenticated channel,
and the certificate is verified by checking that it is signed by the
public key in the TAL. After retrieving a TA certificate, RPs have a
choice between using a previously retrieved locally cached copy of
the TA certificate and the newly retrieved instance of the TA
certificate, provided that both certificates are valid.
Periodic reissuance of TA certificates is a way of ensuring that the
RPKI remains healthy at its root by avoiding ossification and
retaining agility; consequently, RPs refetch the certificates to
adopt changes in the TA's INR [RFC3779] and SIA [RFC5280] extensions.
In the past, some TA certificates were issued with unreasonably long
validity periods: in some cases, up to a century. Since TA
certificates are the root and, thus, have no Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) [RFC5280] covering their own scope, TA operators cannot
revoke previously issued TA certificates. This means that an on-path
adversary or a caching network element could present RPs with an
older instance of the TA certificate than the TA operator intends RPs
to use.
This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme for RPs, preferring:
(1) the "more recently" issued TA certificate,
(2) the TA certificate with the shortest validity period among
certificates with equal notBefore (Section 4.6.1 of [RFC6487]),
and
(3) the "most recently fetched" instance of the TA certificate among
certificates with equal notBefore and equal notAfter
(Section 4.6.2 of [RFC6487]).
This establishes a preorder over TA certificates issued by the same
TA, permitting the issuance of a certificate that is preferred over
any previous certificate.
This document updates Section 3 of [RFC8630].
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Related Work
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "A
Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure" [RFC6481].
2. Updates to RFC 8630
The following text in Section 3 of [RFC8630] is replaced as follows:
OLD:
| In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) TA,
| an RP SHOULD:
|
| 1. Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the TA URI(s)
| contained in the TAL.
|
| 2. Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed
| RPKI CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified
| in [RFC6487].
|
| 3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key
| in the retrieved object.
|
| 4. Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to
| ensure that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing
| this self-signed CA certificate to be a TA. These tests apply
| to the validity of attestations made in the context of the
| RPKI relating to all resources described in the INR
| extension(s) of this certificate.
NEW:
| In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) TA,
| an RP MUST:
|
| 1. Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the TA URI(s)
| contained in the TAL. If this step fails, use the locally
| cached copy of the TA referenced by the TAL previously
| retrieved.
|
| 2. Confirm that the newly retrieved object is a current, validly
| self-signed RPKI CA certificate that conforms to the profile
| as specified in [RFC6487]. If this step fails, use the
| locally cached TA.
|
| 3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key
| in the newly retrieved putative TA. If the keys do not match,
| use the locally cached TA. If the keys match and there is no
| locally cached TA, use the newly retrieved TA.
|
| 4. Check whether the newly retrieved TA has a more recent
| notBefore than the locally cached TA. If the notBefore of the
| newly retrieved TA is less recent, use the locally cached TA.
| If the notBefore of the newly retrieved TA is more recent, use
| the newly retrieved TA.
|
| 5. If the notBefore dates are equal, check whether the newly
| retrieved TA has a shorter validity period than the locally
| cached TA. If the validity period of the newly retrieved TA
| is longer, use the locally cached TA. If the validity period
| of the newly retrieved TA is shorter, use the newly retrieved
| TA.
|
| 6. If the validity periods are equal and the newly retrieved TA
| differs from the locally cached TA, use the newly retrieved
| TA. In the unlikely event that this step is reached, it seems
| most likely that the TA operator intended for RPs to use the
| TA that is currently published.
3. Security Considerations
When RPs inadvertently use a different instance of the TA certificate
than that which the TA operator intended for RPs to use, the
certification path validation process will yield an unexpected
outcome. Some examples of unexpected outcomes are validation
failures or replay attacks. Standardization of a tiebreaking scheme
helps both RP and TA operators arrive at deterministic outcomes. The
specified tiebreaking scheme prevents RPs from accepting a previous
certificate presented by an on-path adversary in the presence of
other TA certificate material.
4. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
5. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8630] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., Kent, S., and T.
Bruijnzeels, "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Trust Anchor Locator", RFC 8630, DOI 10.17487/RFC8630,
August 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8630>.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, George Michaelson, Tom
Harrison, Russ Housley, Mohamed Boucadair, Christer Holmberg, and
Mahesh Jethanandani for their review and feedback.
Authors' Addresses
Job Snijders
BSD Software Development
Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Email: job@bsd.nl
URI: https://www.bsd.nl
Theo Buehler
OpenBSD
Switzerland
Email: tb@openbsd.org
Ties de Kock
RIPE NCC
Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Email: tdekock@ripe.net