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RFC 10097

Tiebreaking Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchors

RFC 10097 is a Proposed Standard published in November 2026 in the IETF stream by the sidrops working group.

Proposed Standard IETF stream sidrops WG Operations and Management

Updates
RFC 8630
Citations
Cites 8 RFCs

Abstract

A Trust Anchor (TA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority (CA) certificate. Over time, Relying Parties (RPs) may have acquired multiple different issuances of valid TA certificates from the same TA operator. This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme to be used by RPs to select one TA certificate for certification path validation. This document updates RFC 8630.

Plain text 12 KB · rfc-editor.org · Datatracker · doi:10.17487/RFC10097 · draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ta-tiebreaker-06

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       J. Snijders
Request for Comments: 10097                                          BSD
Updates: 8630                                                 T. Buehler
Category: Standards Track                                        OpenBSD
ISSN: 2070-1721                                               T. de Kock
                                                                RIPE NCC
                                                           November 2026


  Tiebreaking Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchors

Abstract

   A Trust Anchor (TA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
   is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority (CA)
   certificate.  Over time, Relying Parties (RPs) may have acquired
   multiple different issuances of valid TA certificates from the same
   TA operator.  This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme to be used
   by RPs to select one TA certificate for certification path
   validation.  This document updates RFC 8630.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc10097.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the
   Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described
   in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
     1.1.  Requirements Language
     1.2.  Related Work
   2.  Updates to RFC 8630
   3.  Security Considerations
   4.  IANA Considerations
   5.  Normative References
   Acknowledgements
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) hierarchical
   structure, a Trust Anchor (TA) is an authority for which trust is
   assumed and not derived.  TA operators periodically reissue TA
   certificates to update the validity period (Section 4.1.2.5 of
   [RFC5280]), the Subject Information Access (SIA) extension
   (Section 4.2.2.2 of [RFC5280]), the Certificate Policies extension
   (Section 4.2.1.4 of [RFC5280]), and the Internet Number Resources
   (INRs) ([RFC3779]).

   Relying Parties (RPs) periodically fetch TA certificates from online
   locations and verify that the key of the self-signed certificate
   matches the key embedded in its associated Trust Anchor Locator (TAL)
   [RFC8630].  This transfer may happen via an unauthenticated channel,
   and the certificate is verified by checking that it is signed by the
   public key in the TAL.  After retrieving a TA certificate, RPs have a
   choice between using a previously retrieved locally cached copy of
   the TA certificate and the newly retrieved instance of the TA
   certificate, provided that both certificates are valid.

   Periodic reissuance of TA certificates is a way of ensuring that the
   RPKI remains healthy at its root by avoiding ossification and
   retaining agility; consequently, RPs refetch the certificates to
   adopt changes in the TA's INR [RFC3779] and SIA [RFC5280] extensions.
   In the past, some TA certificates were issued with unreasonably long
   validity periods: in some cases, up to a century.  Since TA
   certificates are the root and, thus, have no Certificate Revocation
   List (CRL) [RFC5280] covering their own scope, TA operators cannot
   revoke previously issued TA certificates.  This means that an on-path
   adversary or a caching network element could present RPs with an
   older instance of the TA certificate than the TA operator intends RPs
   to use.

   This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme for RPs, preferring:

   (1)  the "more recently" issued TA certificate,

   (2)  the TA certificate with the shortest validity period among
        certificates with equal notBefore (Section 4.6.1 of [RFC6487]),
        and

   (3)  the "most recently fetched" instance of the TA certificate among
        certificates with equal notBefore and equal notAfter
        (Section 4.6.2 of [RFC6487]).

   This establishes a preorder over TA certificates issued by the same
   TA, permitting the issuance of a certificate that is preferred over
   any previous certificate.

   This document updates Section 3 of [RFC8630].

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.2.  Related Work

   It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
   described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
   and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "A
   Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure" [RFC6481].

2.  Updates to RFC 8630

   The following text in Section 3 of [RFC8630] is replaced as follows:

   OLD:

   |  In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) TA,
   |  an RP SHOULD:
   |  
   |  1.  Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the TA URI(s)
   |      contained in the TAL.
   |  
   |  2.  Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed
   |      RPKI CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified
   |      in [RFC6487].
   |  
   |  3.  Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key
   |      in the retrieved object.
   |  
   |  4.  Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to
   |      ensure that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing
   |      this self-signed CA certificate to be a TA.  These tests apply
   |      to the validity of attestations made in the context of the
   |      RPKI relating to all resources described in the INR
   |      extension(s) of this certificate.

   NEW:

   |  In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) TA,
   |  an RP MUST:
   |  
   |  1.  Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the TA URI(s)
   |      contained in the TAL.  If this step fails, use the locally
   |      cached copy of the TA referenced by the TAL previously
   |      retrieved.
   |  
   |  2.  Confirm that the newly retrieved object is a current, validly
   |      self-signed RPKI CA certificate that conforms to the profile
   |      as specified in [RFC6487].  If this step fails, use the
   |      locally cached TA.
   |  
   |  3.  Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key
   |      in the newly retrieved putative TA.  If the keys do not match,
   |      use the locally cached TA.  If the keys match and there is no
   |      locally cached TA, use the newly retrieved TA.
   |  
   |  4.  Check whether the newly retrieved TA has a more recent
   |      notBefore than the locally cached TA.  If the notBefore of the
   |      newly retrieved TA is less recent, use the locally cached TA.
   |      If the notBefore of the newly retrieved TA is more recent, use
   |      the newly retrieved TA.
   |  
   |  5.  If the notBefore dates are equal, check whether the newly
   |      retrieved TA has a shorter validity period than the locally
   |      cached TA.  If the validity period of the newly retrieved TA
   |      is longer, use the locally cached TA.  If the validity period
   |      of the newly retrieved TA is shorter, use the newly retrieved
   |      TA.
   |  
   |  6.  If the validity periods are equal and the newly retrieved TA
   |      differs from the locally cached TA, use the newly retrieved
   |      TA.  In the unlikely event that this step is reached, it seems
   |      most likely that the TA operator intended for RPs to use the
   |      TA that is currently published.

3.  Security Considerations

   When RPs inadvertently use a different instance of the TA certificate
   than that which the TA operator intended for RPs to use, the
   certification path validation process will yield an unexpected
   outcome.  Some examples of unexpected outcomes are validation
   failures or replay attacks.  Standardization of a tiebreaking scheme
   helps both RP and TA operators arrive at deterministic outcomes.  The
   specified tiebreaking scheme prevents RPs from accepting a previous
   certificate presented by an on-path adversary in the presence of
   other TA certificate material.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

5.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8630]  Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., Kent, S., and T.
              Bruijnzeels, "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
              Trust Anchor Locator", RFC 8630, DOI 10.17487/RFC8630,
              August 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8630>.

Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank Tim Bruijnzeels, George Michaelson, Tom
   Harrison, Russ Housley, Mohamed Boucadair, Christer Holmberg, and
   Mahesh Jethanandani for their review and feedback.

Authors' Addresses

   Job Snijders
   BSD Software Development
   Amsterdam
   The Netherlands
   Email: job@bsd.nl
   URI:   https://www.bsd.nl


   Theo Buehler
   OpenBSD
   Switzerland
   Email: tb@openbsd.org


   Ties de Kock
   RIPE NCC
   Amsterdam
   The Netherlands
   Email: tdekock@ripe.net
Contents 13
  1. Abstract
  2. Status of This Memo
  3. Copyright Notice
  4. Table of Contents
  5. 1 Introduction
  6. 1.1 Requirements Language
  7. 1.2 Related Work
  8. 2 Updates to RFC 8630
  9. 3 Security Considerations
  10. 4 IANA Considerations
  11. 5 Normative References
  12. Acknowledgements
  13. Authors' Addresses