{
  "number": 10097,
  "title": "Tiebreaking Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchors",
  "authors": [
    "J. Snijders",
    "T. Buehler",
    "T. de Kock"
  ],
  "published": "2026-11",
  "status": "Proposed Standard",
  "stream": "IETF",
  "area": "ops",
  "working_group": "sidrops",
  "pages": 6,
  "formats": [
    "HTML",
    "TXT",
    "PDF",
    "XML"
  ],
  "abstract": "A Trust Anchor (TA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority (CA) certificate. Over time, Relying Parties (RPs) may have acquired multiple different issuances of valid TA certificates from the same TA operator. This document specifies a tiebreaking scheme to be used by RPs to select one TA certificate for certification path validation. This document updates RFC 8630.",
  "keywords": [
    "RPKI",
    "Routing Security",
    "BGP",
    "X.509"
  ],
  "draft": "draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ta-tiebreaker-06",
  "doi": "10.17487/RFC10097",
  "updates": [
    "RFC8630"
  ],
  "urls": {
    "html": "https://rfc.dk/rfc10097/",
    "text": "https://rfc.dk/rfc10097.txt",
    "rfc_editor": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10097",
    "datatracker": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc10097/"
  },
  "text_modified": "2026-11-18T22:36:47.753633975Z"
}
